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PREFACE
This is a study of the governorship of James Bernard Longley. Elect­
ed Maine's sixty-seventh governor in 1974, Longley served one four-year term 
and is the only Independent to be elected governor in the United States since 
1937. This paper will focus on the unique aspect Longley's Independent sta­
tus gave his administration.
The election of an Independent governor attracted national attention.
Columnist David Broder wrote,
What happened in Maine in Seventy-four with the election 
of an independent, could well be a forerunner of some­
thing that would happen in other states or even at the 
presidential level. 1
It was rumored that Longley himself would try an independent bid for the 
Senate or even the presidency after serving one tern as governor. Longley 
was a charismatic, popular governor, but had promised in his campaign not to 
seek reelection. .All expectations, however, were cut short when he discovered 
he was suffering from cancer. He died in 1930 at the age of fifty-six.
One book, The Year of the Longley, by Willis Johnson, has been written 
about Longley. Published in 1978, the book primarily focuses on the early por 
tion of the Longley Administration. A thesis at Bates College, The Politics 
of Anti Politics: Governor Longley and the Maine Legislature, by Marc Gold­
man, examines the Governor's relationship with the legislature during the 
first year of his administration. There is no work, as far as this writer can 
determine, examining Longley's entire governorship.
1
2The primary source of new information in this study is a questionnaire 
sent to participants and knowledgeable observers of Maine state government.
Two hundred and nine questionnaires were sent and forty-two responses were 
received, many with extensive comments, ‘Respondents included eleven Repub­
lican and twelve Democratic legislators, eight people who served as advisors 
to Governor longley, three professors of political science at the University 
of Maine, and three news reporters. Five responses were anonymous. It must 
be remembered, however, that the survey is not meant to be a representative 
sample. The views of most of the respondents are primarily colored by their 
experiences in the state capitol, Augusta, and may not be reflective of those 
in other parts of the state. The Maine Times described Longley's personality,
The more Longley angered the Augusta actors, the more the 
people loved him everywhere else. 2
Other sources of information include interviews, newspaper and magazine arti­
cles.
The paper is organized in four chapters. Chapter one provides background 
information, Longley's personal history is sketched. An emphasis is placed 
on the two years preceding his election. Longley became known to the nublic 
at this time through his leadership in the Maine Management and Cost Survey, 
a commission designed to decrease the cost of state government by increasing 
its efficiency. Longley's philosophy on government and his campaign for gover­
nor are also described.
Chapter two examines Longley's working relationships with the other actors 
in state government. This chapter establishes his identity as an Independent 
governor, his style of governing, and the political tools he used. Longley's 
ability to work with the legislature, bureaucracy, special interests, media,
3and general public is evaluated.
The third chapter of the paper examines Governor Longley's effectiveness 
and success in meeting his goals. The focus is on the advantages and disad­
vantages Longley may have had as an Independent. The quality of the Gover­
nor's appointments, ability to manage the government and provide services to 
the public are evaluated. Governor Longley's attempts to transform Maine's 
educational system is used as a case study to help assess his effectiveness.
There were important issues during Governor Longley's term which are not 
a part of this study. They were omitted because they were not judged to be 
representative of Longley's impact as an Independent. One issue which de­
serves note is the Indian question. Maine's two original tribes, the Passam- 
quaddies and Penobscots, sued the government for two-thirds of Maine's land.
The state was in an uproar when federal courts agreed the Indians had a le­
gitimate case, which was based on the federal violation of an agreement dating 
to 1790. Longley vehemently denied the Indian claims had any validity and re­
fused to soften his position when it became increasingly evident the Indians 
did have a chance of winning. State Attorney General Joseph Brennan publicly 
agreed with Longley. The case was eventually settled after Longley left of­
fice.3
The final chapter appraises Longley's overall performance as governor.
It attempts to determine whether Maine was better off as a result of his gover­
norship. Questionnaire respondents ranked Longley among Maine's four most re­
cent governors to see if he favorably compares with governors who were elected 
as part of one of the two major parties. Those who felt Longley did not do 
well were asked whether his lack of effectiveness was a result of his Inde­
pendent standing or whether the problem was with Longley's own style of gover­
ning. Finally, the chapter explores the possibility of Maine repeating its
precedent and electing another Independent governor.
CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Jin Longley's election to the governorship of Maine in 1974 caught 
the nation by surprise. The national press wasted no tine announcing che 
victory of the first Independent governor in the United States since 1937,
"One of the biggest upsets of the election," Newsweek.^
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"The biggest upset," Tine.
"Perhaps the most astounding political upset of the year, 
even the decade," New York Tines. 6
Maine political observers were just as surprised. A Maine Tines edi- 
torial stated before the election that the presence of four independent can­
didates on the gubernatorial ballot v/as needless "clutter."^ Longley ran a 
poor third behind the two party candidates in election polls throughout the 
state. Just two days before the election the Maine Sunday Telegram declared
Q
in its final election poll that a vote for Longley w s  a wasted vote.
1974 was the year of the Democrats. They gained nine governorships on 
the Republicans. Watergate set the tone for elections across the country. 
Disillusioned by the greatest political scandal in the nations history, vo- 
ers lost confidence in government, politicians, and especially the Republican 
pa ty.
Watergate was not the only gloomy element in the political climate. The 
nation was recovering from the energy crises of 1973-1974. The New England 
states, heavily dependent on oil, felt the effects of the oil embargo as much 
as any region in the country. Confidence in America, the superpower, the 
leader of the free world, was shaken by OPEC.
5
6While oil prices went up, so did everything else. Economists watched 
their own rules break as quickly as graphs could chart the rise of both in­
flation and unemployment. A new word was introduced to the American public- 
stagflation.
The people of Maine felt the shockwaves. The state had been a strong­
hold of the Republican party since the civil war. Its grasp on power began 
to loosen in 1955, when Democrat Edmund Muskie became governor. In the 1960s 
other Democrats began to surface and Muskie was elected to the United States 
Senate. Factions formed in the Maine Republican party as its strength weak­
ened. In 1967 another Democrat, Kenneth Curtis, became governor and also 
served two terms. The Republicans, however, still controlled both houses of
9
the Maine legislature as the 1974 elections approached.
Economics conditions in Maine were worse than the national average. Eco­
nomic expansion from Boston, fifty miles away from the southern tip of Maine, 
reached only a small portion of the state. Maine's per capita income ranked 
fortieth in the United States. It had been years since Maine's civilian unem­
ployment rate was equal to, or lower than, the national rate of unemployment.^ 
Maine is a rural state of one million residents. Three cities--Portland, 
Bangor, and Lewiston— have over 30,000 citizens. The rest of the population 
is spread over a land surface nearly as large as the combined size of the rest 
of flew England. Over 90 percent of the land is covered by forest. The shore­
line, which includes some 200 islands, is the lonqest on the East Coast. 
Twisting and turning over 3,500 miles, the Maine coast is famous for its 
rocky cliffs and picturesque lighthouses.
Most Mainers live off the land in traditional industries. Forestry pro­
vides 47^ of Maine's industrial employment. Farming is also important. Maine 
is second only to Idaho in potato production. Maine also credits the ocean
7for its productivety, most notably its lobster catch, In the summer, tour­
ists flock to the state for an outdoor escape, transforming the Maine coast 
and forests into Vacationland.
The people of Maine are known for their independence. One reason may 
be the geography. The state's large, forested expanse promotes self reliance. 
Maine is also the only state among the forty-eight contiguous states to share 
a common border with only one other state, New Hampshire. History may also 
be a reason. Yankee independence in Maine extends long before 1776. What­
ever the cause of this independence, it was not a shocking proposition for 
Mainers in the 1970s when John Cole, the long time editor of the Maine Times, 
publicly considered the benefits for Maine if it seceded from the union.^
The rise of James Longley in government was as unexpected as the times.
His father, an orphan, died while Longley was in high school. Longley was 
ready to leave school and enter the mills to replace the income of his father, 
a street car ooerator, when his older brother, Howard, decided to work a 
double shift and keep Jim in school. He went on to graduate from Bowdoin Col­
lege in two and one-half years and eventually earned a law degree throuqh 
night school courses at the University of Maine, After working several jobs 
to pay his way through school, Longley earned his fortune in the insurance busi 
ness. By 1972 he acquired national and international experience in the insur­
ance industry. He was also president of the Million Dollar Round Table, an
elite group of the nation’s insurance men who sold at least one million dollars
12
worth of insurance in one year.
Nineteen Seventy-Two is the year Longley's name was first heard by many 
of Maine's citizens. A lifetime Democrat and campaign contributer to Governor 
Curtis, Longley was asked by the Governor to lead the Maine Management and Cost 
Survey. He accepted. The survey became known as the Longley Commission and 
produced the Longley Report.
8The purpose of the survey was to make Maine state government fiscally 
responsible by targeting areas of waste and inefficiency. Governor Curtis 
chose Longley, in part, because he was an outsider to politics and a suc­
cessful businessman. He wanted the survey to be a non-partisan effort 
led by an individual who would not use his high visibility position to 
turn the survey into political controversy.
Longley and his "team leaders," members of the survey effort he dele­
gated authority to, proposed 807 recommendations totalling an estimated $24 
million in savings to Maine. Many of the recommendations were controver­
sial, including a proposal to close three rural branches of the Universi­
ty of Maine system in the name of efficiency. In May of 1973, Curtis 
halted construction on state university campuses while considering Cost 
Survey recommendations. However, by mid-summer, construction resumed 
and Longley and Curtis became rivals. Longley spoke loudly and publicly 
on behalf of survey recommendations, but refused to testify to the legis­
lature in their support. He ctaimed his role in the Survey was Non­
partisan and his neutrality would be questioned if he testified. If the 
Longlev Report was used for partisan purposes, it would lose its tax ex­
empt status with the IRS. Critis later claimed Longley hoped the Survey 
recommendations were not implemented. This gave him the opportunity to 
attack politicians and use the Survey for his own personal gain in politics.
Curtis, an initiator of the report, was placed in a politically 
touchy position. While Longley was challenging him to enact survey recom­
mendations, Curtis determined that many were too controversial. Ninety- 
two bills containing three hundred proposals were presented to the legis­
lature and thirty-three bills eventually became law. Curtis publicly de­
clared the survey a success, tut the actual savings resulting from the
9Longley Report is highly speculative. 'Willis Johnson, in his book 
The Year of the Lonqley, report: that a Curtis Administration press release 
was almost issued announcing survey savings of S15 million. Governor 
Curtis saw the release and declared the figure unrealistic. He randomly
estimated a savings of $10 million and that was the figure used on the
i 13 release.
Longley was not satisfied with the government's implementation of the 
Maine Management and Cost Survey. The recommendations made in the Survey were 
more than efficiency measures to Longley, but the heart of his philosophy 
on government. Longley believed business techniques in the management of 
government are essential.
Strategies for Survival , by David F. Linowes, is the book which best 
lays out the Longley philosophy. Longley labeled the book his "bible" on
government and, once elected, ordered copies for all department heads. The 
book measures social needs against economic needs and discards the idea 
equating dollars spent with program success. Government encourages inef­
ficient programs by throwing increasing sums of money at programs whiid just 
don't work. The management of a program is often to blame. When a program 
is run properly it is rarely given additional funds to reach more people. 
Instead, increasingly larger chunks of money are given to wasteful managers 
claiming an ever greater need. The process leads to
entrenched mediocrities who are convinced 
they're on the right track and have a good 
thing going...maximum ease and minimum 
accountabi1i ty.* ^
Linowes attempts to demonstrate that business executives are no 
smarter than their government counterparts. The system accounts for the 
disparity in their effectiveness. A businessman must show a profit or go
10
out of business. There is constant oversight of each step in the business 
process and a continual search for improvements which keep pace with the 
competitive environment in business.
The book then explains that government goals are more complex than 
shewing a profit. However, the goals must be clearly defined so a program's 
success can be measured, Government usually lacks an oversight process, 
a key ingredient for success. Vacking the competitive environment of business, 
politicians and bureaucrats will often fight to maintain the status quo and 
promote programs which lack humanitarian goals beyond protecting their own 
jobs. The result is an increasingly heavy tax burden on the average citizen.
On April 18, 1974, Longley resigned from the Maine Management and Cost
Survey and publicly considered an independent drive for the governorship.
Critics felt Longley lacked the necessary experience in government, but the
argument did not persuade Lonaely,
I reject this philosophy because to say that good business 
practices cannot be brought to government is to say it is 
the nature of government to be wasteful and inefficient. 15
Governor Curtis, unable to succeed himself in office, left the field 
wide open for gubernatorial candidates. Longley officially entered the 
campaign on June 7, 1974. He joined three other independent candidates 
seeking the governorship. Six Democrats and four Republicans sought their 
party's nomination in unusually long primary campaigns.
The Republicans chose James Erwin, Maine's former attorney general and 
two-time loser of previous gubernatorial campaigns. His 1970 loss to Gover­
nor Curtis was by the slimmest of margins, 51.1 percent to 49.9 percent.
His natural constituency was rural conservatives and he campaigned on a pro- 
gram of limited spending. 1
nThe Democratic nominee was George Mitchell. Age forty, he was an ally 
of Senator Muskie and the state's Democratic National Committeeman. Water­
gate fallout made Mitchell the favorite to win.^ The Republicans brought 
in big names to bolster their state convention--John Connally and George 
Bush--but Connally was almost disinvited when it appeared his presence 
would only add to the turmoil surrounding the party.
An Independent candidate had several technical advantages in the 1974 
election which Maine Independents did not have in previous years. Names 
were placed on the ballot alphabetically and without party labels. This 
emphasized the individual candidates over the party. Voter registration 
laws were made easier. It is reported that there was a campaign spendinq 
limit of $160,000.18
Despite the new election laws, neither party candidate gave Longley 
much of a chance. Mitchell felt Longley would hurt Erwin since both of 
their campaigns emphasized the importance of economic issues. Longley, a 
lifetime Democrat known to tell "bleeding heart" stories from his own 
past, was calculated by the Erwin camp to have a greater appeal to Mitchell 
supporters.
Both Mitchell and Erwin chose to run "low profile" campaigns and re­
frained from attacking the other. Neither candidate appeared to have a
19
greater personal appeal to the electorate than the other. As the elec­
tion approached, some polls found Mitchell pulling away from Erwin, Other 
polls found the two to be running even, with Longley playing the role of 
spoiler. The last Sunday of the campaign, the Maine Sunday Telegram is­
sued the results of its final campaign poll: Mitchell was predicted to 
receive forty-two percent of the vote, Erwin thirty-three percent, and 
Longley, twenty-three percent.^ The Longley campaign was allowed to
12
run full steam ahead and was never slowed by attacks from the opposition.
Sleep didn't slow things down, either. Supporters and critics alike 
agree Longley was a superior campaigner. He allegedly slept only three 
or four hours a night. Campaigning at factories, he would shake hands 
with employees of all three shifts and travel to neighboring areas be­
tween shifts. Republican State Senator S.W. Collins labeled Longley the 
"consummate insurance salesman" in his efforts to sell himself to the peo­
ple of Maine. Others in government considered Longley the consummate poli­
tician.
The Longley campaign had two themes: What he wasn't and what he
was. First, Longley was not a politician, had never been in politics 
before, and did not intend to remain in politics. He promi-j. if 
elected, he would serve only one term. Longley not only ran as a non- 
politician, but continually scorned those who were. He define* n« pro­
fessional politician,
One who uses what should be a service to the people to his 
own benefit and who has no other visible means of support. 21
This theme, aided by good public recognition, an outgoing personality, and
a healthy campaign budget attracted a public disenchanted with politics.
Maine citizens may have been especially receptive to Longley's 
message. The state takes pride in its "citizen legislature." Over half 
of the legislature typically consists of freshman legislators and most do 
not make a career of politics. Longley appeared a part of this tradition. 
He told the people he couldn't lose: he wasn't a professional politician.
If not elected, he would return to his own insurance business and work to 
make it the best in the world.
James Longley was a businessman who believed businessmen were needed 
in government. The Maine Management and Cost Survey provided him with
13*
statewide recognition and a core of support in the business community. The 
Longley campaign did not need to make promises. It was a campaign of con­
victions. Longley tried to extend his core of support by asking voters 
to take a good look at the government, rising taxes, and the professional 
politicians responsible. Then he asked the voters to "THINK ABOUT IT."
They did. The campaign grew from one office, a converted garage, to 
six offices run largely by volunteers ranging from retired citizens to high 
school students too young to vote. Longley grew into more than just the 
business candidate for governor. He would hold down taxes and fight the 
establishment. His simple approach and sincerity attracted "the man on 
the street" with such devotion his campaign was described as "messianic."
A local dishwasher built Longley a birdhouse with arrows pointing toward
the governor's residence. Local barbers polled their clients and called
22
in their increasingly positive results.
The people of Maim flocked to the polls, producing an off-presidential 
year turnout of fifty-seven percent. Longley captured nearly forty percent 
of the vote and the governorship. Mitchell placed second with thirty-seven 
percent and Erwin received twenty-three percent of the vote. Longley won 
approximately forty percent of the Republican vote, thirty percent of the 
Democratic vote, and fifty percent of the Independents. Longley received
O 'i
strong support in his home town, Lewiston, a traditionally Democratic area. ^
Senator Charlotte Z. Sewall, a member of the Maine House during the
Longley Administration, describes his success,
His timing was right--the voters wanted a stop in the increase 
in government and regulation--and new taxes. Both Darties de­
murred from taking thdt hard 1ine--Longley did--and took offl
Maine didn't escape the rising tide of Democratic victories. State
14
Representative William Cohen was the state's only high ranking Republican. 
While the Republicans maintained their majority in the State Senate, Demo­
crats gained control of the House for the first time in a decade. The 
1974 elections brought Maine a unique experiment in government--tripartisan 
politics led by an Independent governor.
CHAPTER TWO: GOVERNOR LONGLEY*S WORKING RELATIONSHIPS 
WITH MAINE'S POLITICAL ACTORS
Now What 
to tRe editor:
all friends of Jim Longley hope he is not like the dog 
that chased a car, caught it, and then didn't know what 
to do about it. Mai Clark Maine Times, November 29, 1974
Sometimes Governor Longley must have wondered just what he should do. 
Dinner table remarks made the front pages. Controversy raged over the 
type of potatoes he served and the kind of car he drove. Critics constantly 
reminded him that running the state of Maine was not the same as beinq chief 
executive officer of a corporation. Longley admitted some of his expecta­
tions toward government were naive. The government acted slower than he 
expected and did not give him the bipartisan support he hoped to obtain.
The role of Maine's governors was strengthened in the years preceding 
Governor Longley's election. The Maine Constitution limits a governor to 
serving a maximum of two terms. In the 1950s the governor's term in of­
fice was extended from two to four years. Governor Curtis reorganized 
the executive branch and increased its power by funding a larger staff.
Maine governors have the exclusive right to prepare the state's binennial
24
budget, which the state constitution requres to be balanced.
However, most observers feel Maine governors face the lenislature from 
a position of weakness. Longley himself ranked the pow^ of Maine' gover­
nors as fiftieth in the United States. The governo’” doe nc: n-ave item 
veto. He does have the power to call a special session of toe lee slature,
15
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but when a special session is called, any matter may be brought up. The 
governor is not the state's top legal officer. The legislature has the 
power to appoint the attorney general. It also appoints the Secretary of 
State, Treasurer, Auditor, and seven member Executive Council.
The Executive Council was a body constitutionally required in Maine 
the first two years of Governor Longley's term. Its consent was required 
on all appointments and the allocation of money. It was to give advice 
and consent on reprieves, pardons, and commutations, The Executive Coun­
cil was also required to give its approval of the removal of any apDoint- 
ees. During Longley's first year in office the legislature, with the 
Governor's support, eliminated the Executive Council. The Governor,
however, did not play a determining role in the process, which had been
25
discussed for several years.
Governor Longley was a pure Independent with no ties to either po­
etical party. Although he was a registered Democrat before the elec­
tor his policies were those of a conservative Republican. Longley was 
net c , independent of political parties, but also of the system. He 
campaigned as a reformer of government. He would fight politicians and 
all who told the public that government needed to keep increasing their 
taxes.
Few resjch dents to the questionnaire believe any group or organiza­
tion served Longley r surrogate party in place of his lack of affili­
ation with the trad t na. arties. Mentioned by four Democrats and four
of Longley's appoin ees, "L igley's Lenion, ' the closest to filling
sons of the functions of a pol 't- :al party. The Legion was Longley's 
core group of supp ters. The grou. was organized while Lungley prepared 
the Cost Survey at later ramed func , tor his campaign. He stayed in
17
touch With them during his term through a newsletter and called on members 
for advice. Democratic State Representative J. Robert Carrier describes 
the Legion, "They were good advisors and worked hard to promote his pro­
grams against continuous odds." Longley's Legion did help his campaign 
for* the governorshipand advisors were drawn from its ranks. However, a 
more common evaluation of the Legion’s role in the Longley Administration 
is given by Joe Hochadel, a legislative counselor to Longley. Hochadel 
limits the Legion's function to,
providing moral support and some hard work on particular 
projects. One must remember he vetoed bills supported 
by much of the ’private sector’ such as special exception 
legislation that provided a tax break to a particular in­
dustry. He truly was independent.
Longley viewed his independence as a two-edged sword. On one hand, 
he had no political base. On the other, he owed no favors. Not everyone, 
though, felt Longley needed a party. Democratic State Senator Nancy Ran­
dall Clark, a member of the Maine House during the Longley Administration, 
believes the devotion of his supporters was enough,
Many followed 'blindly’--almost cult like in response and 
defense of Jim Longley's edicts. His followers would 
smother legislators with Longley's positions on issues up­
on request of the Governor-well organized and well flnanced-- 
with Maine's insurance industry among his chief supporters-- 
yet Longley chided us for responding to special interests.
He only saw one side--HI$.
TABLE ONE:
LONGLEY'S OVERALL WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MAINE LEGISLATURE
Senate (Republican 
controlled)
House (Democrat
controlled)
excellent good fair poor
n : 40
O/o 38%
**ooCM 33%
0% 10% 28* 63%
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Table one illustrates the tripartisan nature of Maine's government 
and Longley's working relationship with each hou of the state legisla­
ture. Although Longley called for bipartisan party support, his policies 
remained as independent in practice as they were in his campaign for gover­
nor. The results indicate a poor working relationship with members of
both houses of the legislature. However, it is not clear whether Governor 
Longley’s independent status contributed to poor executive-legislative re­
lations. Among the factors which may have negatively influenced their re­
lationship include Longley's campaign against politicians, his lack of de­
sire to work with them once elected, and his willingness to work around 
the legislature. Longley's confrontational style of governing, personal­
ity, and inability to form a legislative base were also detrimental to 
executive-legislative relations.
Longley's reforms were more appealing to conservative Republicans 
than Democrats. Despite the overall evaluation that only thirty-eight 
percent of the survey's respondents felt Longley had a good working rela­
tionship with the Maine Senate, the figure rises to sixty-percent when only 
Republicar senators are polled. At one point in the Administration, Repub­
lican leaders were trying to persuade Longley to join their party. Longley 
did nothing to indicate he was interested and the alliance the Republicans 
tried to form never materialized.
Longley's relationship with House Democrats, as Senator Clark's com­
ments indicated, were troublesome. To some, Longley was a traitor. He 
made no secret of his lifelong status as a Democrat. The Democrats were 
accustomed to working with a Democratic Governor the previous eight years. 
Longley, as an independent, left them out of the policy process.
The eight year period prior to the Longley Administration was a time
19
of dramatic growth in $tat<- government. A state income tax was initiated and 
man/ new programs and services were developed. In 1969 the Curtis Administra­
tion presented a budget which increased state spending for new programs by 
$8: million. ‘.An additional $32 million was requested in the 1969 budget to 
meintain growth of existing programs. In contrast, Longley's goal was to put 
a halt to state government growth. Conflict was inevitable. Senator Clark, 
ranking Longley's relationship with House members as fair, commented,
His way or no way. . . we learned to work around him. . . he 
was generally inflexible; established an alliance with the 
Republicans to promote agreed upon goals/objectives; finally 
included the Democrats in his negotiations.
Longley's confrontations with legislators became a regular event in Maine 
politics. The Governor initially made an effort to work with the legislators. 
Weekly meetings were scheduled with the leadership of both parties. Tea was 
held with freshman legislators and county delegations. However, it was at 
one of Longley's social dinners with legislators in the governor's residence 
that Longley removed all doubt from observers who cared to guess the tone of 
executive-legislative relations. Longley accusingly labeled legislators who 
leaked stories to the press in their own interests "pimps," End of dinner. It 
was not the last time legislators would walk out on meetings with Longley.
Longley frequently employed two gubernatorial powers to achieve his legis­
lative goals. The first was the veto. A two-thirds vote of both houses of the 
state legislature is required to override a veto. The second power Longley used 
is the governor's access to the media. Longley succeeded in capturing the media 
and the public's--attention.
Maine government was not accustomed to a heavy reliance on the veto. 
Governor Curtis used the veto only thirty-two times in eight years. None were 
overridden. The last veto overridden was in 1955.
20
When a bill is presented to a Maine governor, he has five days to make 
a decision. In this period, Longley screened all bills through his liaison 
staff, the attorney general's office, and the budget office. Governor Longley 
exercised the veto power a record 109 times. His vetoes were overridden a 
record fifty-six times. Longley explained his attitude toward vetoes to the 
legislature,
I do not view any piece of legislation as minor. If it is 
worthy of the time, effort, and money put forward by the 
legislature to see it through the process, then it certainly 
is worth my time and effort to give it full consideration 
and to base my decision on its merits and demerits and not 
whether it is a minor bill designated to please a particular 
group.
Longley1s willingness to veto "minor" bills is seen from his very first 
veto. The bill was to shorten the name of the Bureau of Labor and Industry to 
the Bureau of Labor. Besides offsetting the symbolic balance between labor 
and industry, Longley felt the bill was a waste of money (in stationery and 
other expenses) in a time of fiscal restraint.
27
The veto was overridden by a vote of 155-16. Legislative leaders tri­
umphantly emerged from the vote, happy to show their Governor who was boss. 
President of the Senate Joe Sewall labeled the vote as "a little disciplinary 
action." Democratic Representative Harlan Baker described the legislative 
process with Governor Longley, "He fought with them [the legislature], insulted 
them,and they overrode his vetoes most of the time." ‘Democratic State Senator 
Paul Colette, a member of the House during the Longley Administration, concurs,
The legislature used to take great joy in overriding Governor 
Longley1s vetoes and together both parties overrode more in 
four years than in the state's history.
Longley's constant attacks fueled a political rivalry between the legis­
lature and the Governor. Longley made phone calls and wrote letters to indi­
vidual legislators to support his positions, but at times his efforts turned
21
personal and included "un-American" accusations toward opponents.
Longley also attacked the validity of the political process. His public 
attacks invited battle with the legislature. Legislative counselor Joe 
Hochadel describes the causes of Longley's poor relations with the legisla­
ture,
First, he was a threat. Second, he was very candid in describ­
ing-the political process to the public. He did not strike deals 
or trade one vote for another. He acted based on his ideals and 
the perceived merits of each bill. He also attacked sacred cows 
such as legislative junkets, state funded extravaganzas for legis 
lative and executive members, etc. The legislature (generally) 
resented him for it.
TABLE TWO: AN EVALUATION OF GOVERNOR LONGLEY*S OVERALL WORKING RELATIONSHIP
WITH FOUR GROUPS OF GQVERNHENT ACTORS
n: 41
excellent good fair poor
state government bureaucracy 53 153 403 403
interest groups 03 183 533 253
media 24?$ 393 223 153
general public 80” 173 23 03
Table Two provides an evaluation of Longley's working relationship with 
actors in the political arena other than state legislators. Responses leave 
little doubt the Governor was very popular with the people, but perceived 
negatively by established groups who had to work with him.
Governor Longley was elected with less than 40?$ of the vote. Neverthe­
less, he viewed his victory as a mandate from the people and counted on their 
support for the success of his programs. Longley felt his job was to bring
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government back to the people, reminding Maine citizens they were the boss 
and elected officials were the public servants, Longley insisted state govern­
ment be more responsive, Longley personally replied to many letters sent to 
the state. In all cases, he instituted the policy requiring a response with­
in seven days.
It is hard to find an observer of Maine government who feels any governor, 
regardless of party status, could have had a better relationship with the pub­
lic than James Longley. State Senator Violette believes, “He was very good 
with the public. Jim Longley could have done anything he wanted and never 
suffered the blame." Senator Clark, though critical of Longley's governorship, 
also rated Longley's relationship with the general public as excellent,
He was 'an ordinary' citizen disdaining the trappings of 
his office. He articulated his frustration and disgust 
with bureaucracy— reflecting in large measure the distrust 
of John and Mary Q. Maine Citizen at that time.
Senator Clark, like others, does not limit Longley's popularity in Maine as
unique to Maine alone. She continues, “I honestly think he would have run
for President of the U.S. . . .  and elected."
Longley did have post-Watergate Presidential qualities. Like Jimmy Carter 
1n 1976, Longley was an outsider who looked down on the establishment. It was 
easy to view Longley as "one of the people." He jogged every morning and was 
known to frequent a donut shop at the end of a run. One cold morning a car 
got a flat tire on the road outside the governor’s residence. The story of 
Longley coming out himself to change the tire was widely circulated.
Longley combined this image with the attraction of Ronald Reagan. Longley 
appealed to a sense of patriotism and Mainers sense of identity with their 
state. Voters knew Longley would "fight the freight train of runaway expense" 
and keep their taxes down. Government was to be decreased and Longley, with
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the support of the public, would stand up to the establishment, fight the 
status quo of bigqer government and more spending, and bring government back 
to the people.
His sincerity was never questioned. Some opponents, however, felt his 
programs and ideas were too simplistic. He told the people what they wanted 
to hear--and what he believed— but implementing his plans would be disastrous.
It is no accident the figures in table two indicate Longley's excellent 
public relations are in direct contrast to his rating with special interest 
groups and the bureaucracy. Both were favorite targets of Longley. Lawyer 
and Republican State Senator S.W. Collins describes the correlation, “his 
dramatic flailing of straw devils and occasionally those who deserved it 
pleased the public in the post-Watergate atmosphere."
Special interest groups could not pressure Longley and did not establish
a working relationship with the Governor. Longley's attitude was oriented
toward what he perceived as the overall good of Maine,
I have learned that it is impossible to be a popular governor 
with every special interest group in the state and still do 
what you think is right for the people of the state.
Longley was supported by the business community as a whole, but did not 
favor specific interests. Educators were furious with Longley's budget cuts. 
Women's groups resented his reluctance to appoint women.
Unions did not receive legislative support from Longley. The Maine State 
Employees Association made headlines in its fights with the Governor. The 
bureaucracy was a favorite target of Longley's and an enemy whose growth was 
to be stopped. Longley told the public that bureaucrats should work as hard 
for their money as the taxpayers who paid them. Longley stopped hiring state 
employees and froze their pay. H left office in the middle of an unresolved
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salary battle with state employees. The morale of bureaucrats during 
Longley's term was low.
Longley's relationship with the press was, by all accounts, interesting. 
Over sixty percent of the survey's respondents in Table Two felt Longley's 
working relationship with the press was at least good. However, top ad­
ministration officials and members of the media consistently ranked their 
relations as fair to poor. The disparity can be explained: Longley created
difficult working conditions for reporters. This fact is often lost to those 
who only had to read, listen and watch the results--Longley made great news 
copy.
One of the first promises made by Governor-elect Joseph Brennan in 1978 
was to remove the "inaccessibility and secrecy" of the Longley years. Soon 
after taking office, reporters found they would not have the same accessi­
bility with Governor Longley as they were accustomed to with Governor Curtis. 
Curtis got along well with the media and was available for unannounced, walk- 
in visits. Longley had a closed door approach (literally— he installed Dutch 
doors) and required appointments. His famous "pimp" comment was directed 
toward those who leaked information to the press. Some reporters felt they 
were being used by Longley. For example, he would tell stories about welfare 
cheats, but refused to give their names or the town they lived in, as the in­
formation was given to him in confidence. Reporters had no way of determining 
the authenticity of Longley's stories. Ralph Lowe, one of the top officials 
in the Longley Administration, blames Longley's own temperament for problems 
with the press,
He tried to maintain the private citizens approach to govern­
ment and never reconciled himself to the idea that the media 
could be so interested in everything he did. . . even going 
to the bathroom.
Longley was conscious of the value of the media. His top aides were ex-
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perts in handling the media. When angered by what he perceived as unfair 
press coverage, Longley did not hesitate to respond to the source of the re­
porting. Often he wrote letters or editorials expounding his point of view.
The Governor and the press were a "dynamic duo" of sorts. Longley 
needed the media to reach his public; reporters needed good copy. Despite 
the barriers Longley set up, Lowe believes the press enjoyed the challenge 
of covering him. Mel Leary, a member of the state house press corps, looks 
back on the period as "the most exciting time of my career."
Some of that excitement was from the unexpected. Regular press confer­
ences were scheduled and a Longley press conference was different from any 
other. His isolation as an independent in the policy process and secrecy in 
general led to surprises when Longley did reveal information. When asked 
what factors were most likely to affect Governor Longley's actions, State 
Representative H. Craig Higgins replied, "The moon. The closer to a full moon, 
the more erratic the actions he took." Frustrating to legislators, the sur­
prises kept reporters on their toes.
Even when Longley didn't have any bombshells to drop on the press, his 
conferences often were extraordinary. WLB2-TV news reporter and anchor Don 
Carrigan describes Longley press conferences as "the stuff of legend." At 
one conference,
Longley used the words from the song 'If I were a Carpenter' 
to illustrate some point. . . the song lyrics were totally 
meaningless in that context, yet you knew, somewhere, there 
was a deep meaning known only to Longley himself. It was 
not unusual at press conferences for him to soar off on some 
flight of ideology that didn't really relate to the topic at 
hand. . . reporters would look at each other as he went on 
for four or five minutes at a time, and eventually would come 
back to earth.
Longley's relations with every group involved in Maine government was
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influenced by one factor above all else— his personality, 
tive Louis Jalbert, from Longley's home town of Lewiston, 
governor. He believes Longley's personality compensated 
political party,
State Representa- 
worked with several 
for his lack of a
He was probably the most strong-willed person I ever met. 
It would be very difficult to rate him because he was out 
of the ordinary. His strong will was his power base.
CHAPTER THREE: LONGLEY AS CHIEF EXECUTIVE
Governor Longley believed his independent status would not damage the 
two party system, but strengthen it. He perceived the two parties as grow­
ing complacent, catering to the needs of their own institutions before the 
needs of the people. Longley expressed the anger of the people and felt 
independents were needed to shake the parties out of their complacency.
Longley wasted no time translating his anger with the system into
practice as governor. In his inaugural address, Longley asked a legislature
accustomed to eight years of government expansion
. . .  to declare a one-year moratorium on new proqrams that 
will cost money, unless the money can be found or is now in 
an existing program with a lower priority of need. . . the 
people of Maine deserve this reassessment. . . a period in 
which we can fully examine the bureaucracy and establish 
our priorities. 29
Filling gubernatorial appointments was Longley's first major task in 
the transition between such different administrations. Allan Pease, an ad­
ministrative assistant for both Governors Curtis and Longley, believes Long­
ley, as an independent, had to look for advisors outside the traditional po­
litical arena,
Curtis, being a party man, had a natural nucleus to which 
to turn. . . Longley had to go to more private people not 
involved in politics or the governmental process; so he 
got a different type of input. . . which reflected a small­
er pool of information. 30
27
28
TABLE THREE: A RANKING OF THE OVERALL QUALITY OF APPOINTMENTS GOVERNOR LONGLEY
MADE TO HIS STAFF, CABINET, AND BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS
n: 4Q
Excellent Good Fair Poor
32% 48;> 15T 5"
Table three is an indication that the quality of Longley's appointments 
was high. Democrats and Republicans priased the Governor's selection process. 
Longley believed his status as an Independent without political obligations 
served to his advantage. Longley utilized his contacts in the business community 
to bring new faces into government. Many appointees left higher paying positions 
to serve state government. Members of both parties received appointments based 
on their qualifications. Survey responses praising Longley's appointments in­
cluded:
Longley lured people from the private sector, also appointed 
dedicated career public service people. Free to appoint 
without the political burdens that seem to hound party 
candidates.
A clean sweep of political hacks.
Selected individuals who came to Augusta to do_ a job, not 
get a job.
Controversy did surround Longley's early appointment process. Possibly
to avoid the state constitutional requirement that the removal of all appointees
must first be approved by the Executive Council, Longley asked each department
head to turn in an updated letter of resignation. Roberta Weil, Commissioner
of the Department of Business Regulation, refused to turn in an undated letter of
resignation as a matter of principle. Her story was front page news before she
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was finally replaced.
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Ralph Lowe believes Long ley set policy within the government and i-m de "gated
his authority, within established guidelines, to his appointees. ►* >.-ver, most
observers felt Longley's domineering personality resulted in a power structure
more centralized than in previous administrations. Kenneth Palmer, political
scientist at the University of Maine, describes Longley as,
a workaholic. He was a self-made man in the insurance 
business and tried to run the state the same way. For 
example, Longley personally interviewed every person who 
requested a pardon. It was a nice thing to do, but a 
governor doesn't have the time. He tried to do everything 
himself, just was not a delegator.
Longley received much praise for his judicial aponintments. Maine 
governors traditionally handed these positions out a: political favors. Longley 
changed this process, determining all of his selections on merit. Survey 
respondents of both parties consider this change one of the lasting accomplish­
ments of his administration.
TABLE FOUR: A RANKING OF GOVERNOR LANGLEY'S OVERALL SUCCESS IN REACHING HIS GOALS
n:39
highly
successful successful unsucces sful
highly
unsuccessful
Increased efficiency 21% 54.o 25:; 0%
Budget reduction 2 2 % 54% 25% 2 %
Improved economy 2 0 % 2 6 % 44’; 0 %
Transforming social 
services
0 % 51% 38'; 11%
Transforming higher 
education
2 % 35', 41% 21
TABLE FIVE: AN EVALUATION OF THE QUALITY OF THE LONGLEY ADMINISTRATION'S
IMPACT ON GOVERNMENT
excel 1ent good fair Door
Managing bureaucracy 23. 33%
28:; 10%
Delivering services 8% 34';
37% 21%
Health and welfare 5% 2 2 % 43%
20%
Education 2 % 2 0 % 30%
35%
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Tables Four and Five measure the results of Governor Longley's leader­
ship. They are presented together to make a direct comparison easier. Table 
Four is an assessment of Governor Longley's ability to meet his objectives, 
regardless of whether respondents felt the Governor’s goals were beneficial or 
detrimental to Maine. Table Five is an evaluation of his impact, not withstanding 
his success in meeting his own intentions.
Partisan lines were evident in evaluating responses. Longley’s advisors, 
as a whole, gave him ratings of successful or highly successful in every category 
except education. Republican responses closely matched those of Longley's 
advisors. Democrats felt the Governor was successful in meeting his efficiency 
and budget reduction goals, were divided in their judgement on Longley's ability 
to improve the economy, and gave him unsuccessful and highly unsuccessful ratings 
in his ability to transform social services and higher education. The trend 
was continued in responses recorded in Table Five. Democrats were divided in 
evaluating Longley's ability to manage the bureaucracy. In each of the other 
categories he was given ratines of fair to poor.
The governor hoped the private sector would help government improve under 
his leadership. While he was successful in bringing private businessmen into 
government to serve on boards and commissions, often voluntarily, Longley did 
not succeed in enticing whole industries to participate voluntarily in state 
initiatives.
At the beginning of his administration, Longley requested a voluntary, one 
year moratorium on utility rate increases. The request was ignored by state 
utilities. Longley's plans to establish a low cost drug program for the elderly 
also required the cooperation of the private sector. Maine news reporter Bill 
Johnson believes tne program, as Longley evisioned it, did not work. Despite 
the program's failure, Johnson explains in his response to the questionnaire how 
the program became a personal success for Longley:
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He (Longley) proposed a program of low-cost druos for the 
elderly, but called for an appropriation of one dollar. He 
asked private drug companies to provide drugs, which they 
didn't do. A state representative then sponsored legislation 
calling for three million dollars to finance a low-cost 
prescription drug program for the elderly. Longley vetoed 
the bill. He priased the idea of a low-cost program for the 
elderly, but denounced "excessive and extravagant" spending, 
politics as usual, etc. The legislature enacted the program 
over his veto. Many elderly people who heard Longley propose 
the program credit him with being responsible for it. In this 
case, he seemed to win public approval in two ways. First, he 
was an advocate for the elderly and a program that had 
widespread public support. Second, he seemed to win approval 
by denouncing excessive spending when he vetoed the bill, 
saying there were more businesslike ways of running the program.
He was in favor of helping the elderly and against 
excessive spending. That put him in tune with most of the people.
Similar initiatives did not become a major part of the Longley Administration. 
However, they are one sign of Longley's efforts to work outside the legislature 
and bureaucracy to accomplish his goals. His initial legislative program 
consisted on only thirty-two bills and an inaugural speech request for a 
shortened legislative session so Maine could reassess its government.
TABLE SIX: NUMBER OF BILLS INTRODUCED AND PASSED OURING MAINE LEGISLATIVE
SESSIONS.
number of bills number of 1
introduced passed
106th Legislature (1973-1974) 2015 1022
107th Legislature (1975-1976) 2013 928
108th Legislature (1977-1978) 1366 829
Table Six is a listing of the number of bills introduced and passed by 
the final legislature of Governor Curtis* tenure in office and the two legis­
latures which met during Governor Longley’s term. Although the number of 
bills passed through the legislature significantly declined during Governor 
Lonaley's terms, the numbers indicate that the 107the Legislature ignored his 
request for a reduced legislative program.
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The Governor's record setting use of the veto power n.je it difficult 
for the legislature to initiate major programs, especially since each house 
was controlled by a different party. The numbers in Table Six only indicate 
the quantity of bills considered by the legislature. The number of major 
bills passed, however, was also slim. The Maine Times describes legislative 
action in 1977,
Like a moose mired in the mud, the 108th legislature thrashes 
mightily, splashing minor bills in all directions but apparent­
ly unable to free itself from the morass of past issues and 
future taxes. 32
Governor Longly inherited the largest deficit-in Maine history upon taking of­
fice in 1975. Above all else, Longley wanted to keep government spending to 
a minimum and protect the Maine taxpayer. Longley intended to eliminate the 
deficit. This priority, by necessity meant the legislature could not initi­
ate Major programs if he was to succeed.
The two biennial budgets prepared by Governor Longley called for state 
spending of $703.1 million and 862.5 million. This averages to approximate­
ly a ten percent annual increase in expenditures. This figure is significant­
ly lower than the spending increases during the Curtis years. Although 
Longley's 1975-1976 budget increased spending from Governor Curtis' budget of 
$530 million for 1973-1974, the budget was balanced without any tax increases. 
Much of the increased spending was for new and ongoing programs passed by the 
106th legislature.^
Strict economy measures were taken to hold the line on spending. Long­
ley collected only $20,000 of his $35,000 salary as governor. Thousands of 
dollars were saved on the upkeep of the governor's residence. These savings 
included a reduction in the maintenance staff. Out of state travel was eli­
minated for most members of the government. Pay increases were halted. The
13,
operating budget of each department was reduced by seven percent to force ef­
ficiency. In some instances programs were eliminated or drastically altered. 
Town road improvement funds and snowplow services were transferred to the 
local level.34
In 1975, Longley's first year as governor, Republican President of the 
Senate and Democratic Speaker of the House John Martin agreed no major legis­
lative changes could be made without a tax increase. The austerity of the 
Longley budget left little room for new spending. Nevertheless, they pro­
ceeded to pass, over Longley's objections, a S4.9 million supplemental bud­
get to be used for human services. Longley vetoed the budget, explaining 
that it would force new taxes on the Maine citizen. However, the bill had 
the support of the leadership of both parties and the veto was overridden. 
Legislative overrides were typical when Longley was up against a united leader­
ship of both parties. The regular session of the legislature was followed by 
a special session which increased the income tax of Maine citizens by $17 mil - 
ion. Again, Longley vetoed the action only to have it overridden by the legis­
lature.
This was the only major tax increase during Governor Longley's term.
Overall, Maine's rate of taxation was the nation's exception to the upward
spiral of taxes. Even with the tax increase, the tax burden on Maine citizens,
when compared with the national average, decreased. Using 100 as the national
average, Maine taxpayers paid at 102.4 in 1975. By 1977 the base number for
Maine citizens was 97.2 below the national average. Twice during Longley's
four year term Maine was the only state where per-capita state and local taxes
were reduced. Nationally, state and local tax rates increased by an average
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of twelve percent. In Maine, they were reduced by two percent.
Governor Longley was able to increase modestly the size of the budget.
fight taxes, and still generate a surplus. To do this, he benefitted from 
improving national and state economies.
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TABLE SEVEN: NATIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AND MAINE'S UNEMPLOYMENT RATE FOR
ALL CIVILIAN WORKERS. Figures taken from the Economic Report
of the President, 1984.
YEAR U.,s. MAINE
1975 8. 10.32
1976 7, 8.9*
1977 7.M 8.4*
1978 6, 6 . U
Maine's own economic recovery outpaced the nation's. Table Seven com­
pares Maine’s unemployment rate to the nation's. 1978, Longley’s last year 
as governor, was the first time in years that Maine's unemployment rate was 
not above the national average.
Governor Longley perceived himself as a goodwill ambassador for Maine.
In efforts to improve the state's economy, he went on many unannounced "in­
dustrial development missions" in other parts of the country. By the end of 
his term, eighty-six companies expanded their facilities in Maine and seventy- 
four opened plants. Two thousand three hundred jots were added to the state. 
Longley left office before the benefits of his most successful coup were felt.
He gave Pratt and Whitney Aircraft $2 million in special tax benefits to open
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a plant in southern Maine. Two thousand jobs were expected to be created.
All this was accomplished after the Governor reduced the state's economic de­
35
velopment agency from fifty-three staffers in nine offices to one office and
37
nine staff people.
Structural changes were made in other state programs. Governor longley
believed the bureaucracy had become ,00 large and too inefficient. Professor
Kenneth Palmer agrees, saying in an interview,
The number of people receiving food stamps was cut by forty- 
five percent within thirty months. Longley reduced the pro­
gram's administration from three hundred and two people to 
one hundred and seventy-eight. 38
Longley also transformed Maine's Aid to Family's with Dependent Children 
program. The maximum allowable grant was increased fey forty-five percent, but
the number of people served by the program was reduced by twenty-five rercent.
The purpose of the change was to Increase aid to the truly needy and eliminate
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benefits to those trying to cheat the system and were able to work. Gover­
nor Longley personally visited families who claimed to be unfairly cut from 
the program.
State bureaucrats were unhappy with Longley policies. A hiring freeze
reduced their numbers by fifteen percent in a process labor leaders described
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as " cutting state jobs by attrition." State employees and the Governor 
fought over their pay throughout the Administration. There was a pay freeze 
in 1975, a seven and seven-tenths pay increase in 1976, and that would have 
been it as far as Longley was concerned. The legislature issued a pay raise 
over Longley's veto in 1977. When the Governor left office, longstanding 
labor negotiations were left unresolved.
Governor Longley and Maine taxpayers reaped the benefits of his efficien­
cy measures in 1973. The Governor reported a $40 million surplus in the bud­
get.
36
A tax rebate and two tax cuts were made, returning most of the money to
the people. All Maine residential property owners received a rebate of sixty-
fou^ dollars. Those who rented their residential units received thrity-two
dollars. Personal income taxes were cut by $4 million. The first corporate
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tax cut in the state's history was also passed. Governor Longley and his 
supporters considered the turn aound in the state budget one of his major 
accomplishments as Governor.
Governor Longley1s efforts to transform the educational establishment 
in Maine were highly controversial and provide a good case study in under­
standing his policies and impact as governor. When he took office, educational 
funds were running a $30 million deficit. Longley had been working to erase 
this deficit before he began campaigning for governor. The Maine Management 
and Cost Survey recommended that three rural campuses from the seven existing 
University of Maine campuses be transformed into two year vocational schools. 
Paul Violette, presently the Senate Majority Leader and a member of the House 
during Longley's term, believes Longley overstepped his bounds with his recom­
mendations,
Longley went beyond making administrative suggestions on how 
government should operate and began making political decisions 
determining policy.
Once elected, Longley found little legislative support for this policy.
The seven four-year campuses continued to operate. However, Longley was able 
to transform the educational establishment in other areas* The University re­
quested a $20 million increase to its $69.9 million budget when Longley was 
preparing his first budget. It received a 3200,000 increase. The University's 
chancellor called the budget "a disaster," Further reductions in Longley's 
second budget eliminated all growth. Several survey respondents believed
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Longley was successful in neet.ng his goals to transform higher education, but
I
his success was detrimental to the state. State Representative Robert Murray, 
dr., gives Longley no credit, "His budget reductions in the area of higher ed­
ucation were devastating. We are still trying to recover!" The University 
of Maine receives a smaller percentage of the state budget today than it did 
before Longley was governor.
Educators hoped to establish a University of Maine medical school.
Longley stopped their efforts, but negotiated agreements with Tufts and the 
University of Vermont to more than double the number of‘Maine students admit­
ted to their schools. Longley attempted to use the issue to gain administra­
tive control of the University. Claiming officials wasted $500,000 promoting 
a medical school, he called for the resignations of the entire University
Board of Trustees. They die not resign. Their refusal was accompanied by an 
explanation of the checks and balances of government.
Standardized tests indicating the quality of education students were pro­
vided with in Maine do not reveal any effects on education resulting from 
Governor Longley1s policies. However, enrollment in the University of Maine 
decreased from 31,100 students in 1976 to 30,100 students in 1978. The drop 
occurred while the overall student population in the state increased. Enroll­
ment in Maine's private schools advanced from 9,400 students to 11,300 students
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in the same period of time.
Governor Longley's major impact in education below the University level 
was his support in changing the funding policy for local school. In 1977 he 
considered a citizen based plan to repeal Maine's Uniform Property Tax one of 
his top priorities. The movement had similarities with California's Proposi­
tion 13 tax revolt in 1978, but Governor Longley, unlike Governor Brown, gave
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the effort his support from the beginning. The Uniforn Property Tax was de­
signed to provide equal education funding throughout the state. It failed.
Even "pay-inH towns which received a total of $5.1 million from richer com-
43
muni ties were unhappy. They resented state involvement at the expense of 
local control and the tax change was implemented.
The elimination of the education deficit, increased local funding and 
diversion of the need for a medical school illustrate Governor Longley’s ef­
fectiveness in bringing a business and efficiency oriented approach to govern­
ment. However, major policy changes, including the closure of three branches 
of the University of Maine, were prevented by University trustees and the 
state legislature.
CHAPTER FOUR: WHAT INDEPENDENT GOVERNOR LONGLEY MEANT TO MAINE
Question: How do you evaluate Governor Longley and his administration:
Answer one: "Longley will always be a standard to measure all others.,"
--Ralph Lowe, one of Longley1s too aides.
Answer two: "He was a shithead.‘--a state legislator requesting anonymity.
The comments above represent the extreme varience in rating the benefits 
of Governor Longley's Independent governorship. All of the Governor's appoin­
tees and eight of the nine Republicans who responded to this question indicate 
the state was at least b^.ter off. Seven of the eleven Democrats who answered 
felt the state was at least worse off. The partisan difference in judgement 
is a reflection of Longley’s conservatism, not his party preference. Longley 
politically was a pure indeoendent. Maine Senate Majority Leader Paul Violette 
succintly summarizes the view of many legislatures, "To Longley, they were all 
political hacks."
TABLE EIGHT: A RATING OF THE OVERALL CONSEQUENCES OF THE LONGLEY ADMINISTRATION
FOR THE STATE OF MAINE
N: 39
much better off better off no difference worse off much worse off 
17% 26% 14% 31% 3%
Governor Longley’s leadership can be assessed in two ways: the day-to-
day operation of state government and the lasting impact he has had on Maine
39
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governnent and politics. His objectives and accomplishments did not emphasize 
initiating new government programs.
Any discussion of the benefits of the Longley Administration must be­
gin with his impact on "the people." At a time when the public was disenchan­
ted with politics and politicians,'Longley's popularity ratings tipped 80f3
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in some survey at the end of his term, Maine political scientist John 
Nickerson drawo a comparison between Longley's leadership and the social con­
tract theorized by Roussean, "The general public loved everything the man 
uttered except anything that would hurt their particular interests." Senator 
Violette agrees, "H- was very good with people. Jim Longley could have done 
anything he wanted and never suffered the blame."
The sincerity of James Longley was a major source of his success with the 
public. He was stubborn and combative, but the peoole always felt his battles 
were based on an ideal, a vision in their best interests and not for his per­
sonal gain Governor Longley considered running for reelection and by almost 
all accounts he would have been an easy winner. In 1974, the Bangor Daily News 
broke a fifty year tradition of Republican support to back Jim Longley. It be­
lieved Longley was ". . . more than a carefully organized politician, more than
an experienced public servant and, indeed, more even than an aspiring individu-
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al, James B. Longley seems an idea whose day has come for Maine." Four years 
later, it encouraged Governor Longley to finish the job and run for reelecti n. 
After a period of indecision, Longley decided to stick co his promise of serving 
only one term. Longley1s top aide, Jim McGregor, later praised Longley for hi 
decision,
I think that the fact that he kept his word and declined to seek 
reelection, in the face of overwhelming evidence that he could 
win easily, may have been the best thing to ever happen to Maine 
politics.
41
That crucial decision came at a time when people had 
jus^ about lost all confidence in government and the po­
litical system. A successful, popular politician who, in 
the final analysis, kep his word. . . that may have been 
Jim Longley's major accomplishment. 46
Longley may have been the right man at the right time. He arrived after
a period of substantial growth and gave the government time to catch up with
its own expansion. He also kept the people aware of politics at a time when
they were likely to turn their backs on the process. Legislative counselor
Joe Hochadel believes Longley’s ideas have made a lasting impact on the state,
Every candidate thathas since run has emphasized fiscal re­
sponsibility. Legislators who never uttered, or probably 
considered, the phrase before Longley use it as a motto in 
their campaigns. He brought new people into government. He 
demonstrated to the public that one man can make a differ­
ence. He showed the bureaucracy that people do care about 
waste and that each dollar wasted works as a hardship in the 
truly needy.
Both Hochadel and McGregor emphasize the symbolic value of Longley’s
victory. Supporters of Longley point to his success in taking a financially
troubled state and turning the budget into a surplus. Beyond the day-to-day
operations of the state, though, they emphasize Longley’s impact in terms of
ideas. Governor Longley's status as an Independent put him on a pedestal,
alone and uncompromising, in his fight against all politicians. George Mitchell,
the Democratic front runner for governor in the 1974 election, believes,
Perhaps his most lasting contribution was that at a time when 
most .Americans felt powerless in an impersonal society, Jim 
Longley showed that one person can make a differences. 47
Longley's impact was the impact of just one person, albeit an energetic one.
During the first two years of his term, the number of registered Independents
in Maine increased seven and one-half percent. While the number of Independents
approached the number of registered Democrats and Republicans, this did not
help Independent candidates for public office. In the 1976 elections Longley
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encouraged others to run as Independents. Twenty-nine people, including 
his sister Connie, chose to run. This was three times the number in the 
previous election. Longley also endorsed twenty Republicans and four Demo­
crats. All twenty-nine Independents and half of the party candidates lost.
In the 1978 gubernatorial election, the Reverend Buddy Frankland chose
to run as an Independent on a platform of continuing Longley's policies.
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He received only thirteen percent of the vote. Both of the party candidates 
also tried to identify themselves with Longley. Democratic Attorney General 
Joseph Brennan succeeded. Together Longley and Brennan were seen protecting 
Maine in the Indian lawsuit. Brennan won the election.
Brennan's election made some view Longley as a caretaker governor with 
few accomplishments. Brenna, like Governor Curtis, is viewed as a liberal 
Democrat. His election minimizes the lasting effects of Longley’s term. 
Langley's tenure is especially seen as a holding pattern for Maine because 
of its tripartisan nature. Longley vetoed more bills than a governor belong­
ing to a political party would be expected to veto. Because the legislature 
was split, it had a more difficult time overriding the Governor's vetoes than 
if one party had control of both houses.
Ralph Lowe recognizes these arguments, but still believes Maine was bet­
ter off as a result of the Longley Administration,
Longley's basic challenge of the premises of the old way, 
or political way, of doing things has lasted into succeed­
ing Administration. However, by using his first term as a 
challenge of the system and then leaving without attempt­
ing to initiate productive programs in his second, will, I 
believe, diminish the overall lasting benefits of his in­
cumbency.
Tnere is evidence to suggest Longley would have been successful in a 
second term as governor, though Lowe admits the nature of the progress Longley 
might have initiated in a second term is an "enigma." There are two reasons
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to predict Longley may have been more successful in his second term than in 
his first. One, he "mellowed," or politically matured. At the beginning 
of his tern, he was suspicious of everything the government was doing and 
unnecessarily challenged it time and again. The last two years, he was more 
familiar with the system and possibly more aware that his attacks were 
counterproductive. As an independent without a power base, he needed to en­
courage bipartisan support rather than alienate the legislators. Two, the 
legislature recognized Longley's immense popularity and became more willing 
to work with him. Some respondents felt the legislature was intent on prov­
ing an Independent could not succeed, but when the legislators recognized 
Longley had sustained public support, their efforts would only be hurting 
themselves.
Some feel Longley’s Independent status hurt him, regardless of public 
support. It prevented the continuity of his programs. Republican legislator 
Darryl Brown explains,
While Longley had a high level of support from many during 
his administration, his programs lacked the continuance that 
an organized political party can offer. Unfortunately, his 
name lives on, but his program does not.
Senator Clark wishes Longley's program lived on an additional four years, but
for different reasons,
HE was the average citizens savior. . . the "second coming". . . 
but some cracks in his system of governing were beginning to 
show--I sometimes wish Jim Longley had run successfully for 
another term— (risking the breaking of his promise to serve 
only one term) because he would have been elected. Then he 
would have had to account for the debacle of his first term.
Oh, sweet revenge. . .
Those who feel Maine was worse off on account of the Longley Administra­
tion offered a variety of reasons. Some felt he simply didn't grasp the nature 
of government and his attempts to run it as a business bordered on disastrous.
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He hurt the bureaucracy. He weakened faith in our political institutions 
through his attacks. Education was hurt and still hasn't recovered.
Longley was also attacked for promoting a false economy. The tax re­
bate supporters look at as a major accomplishment, detractors believe left 
the government nearly bankrupt. They believe the money he gave away was 
needed for necessary capital expenditures. Leaving office when he did, 
the Brennan Administration was forced to spend money on the maintenance 
and replacement of equipment which should have been Longley1s responsibility.
TABLE NINE: A RANKING OF MAINE'S FOUR MOST RECENT GOVERNORS IN TERMS OF 
THEIR OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS AND SUCCESS.
n: 38
1st 2nd 3rd 4 th
John Reed (R), 1961-1966 8% 22% 44% 25*
Kenneth Curtis (D), 1967-1374 37% 29% 16% 163
James Longley (I), 1975-1978 * iO r' -j C  .o 162 21% 32*
Joseph Brennan (D), 1979-198- 26% 34* 21% 182
Table Nine compares Governor Longley to other Maine Governors. The 
trend of favorable responses from Republicans and those who worked within the 
Administration continues. Democrats generally ranked Longley third or fourth. 
Governors Longley and Brennan received the strongest partisan evaluations. 
Governor Curtis was evaluated positively by members of both parties. He is 
generally considered to be the governor who brought Maine state government
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into the modern era and was successful in initiating many new programs.
Governor Reed, though favored more by Republicans than Democrats, seemed 
to rank third of everyone's list. Reed was considered a "stand pat" governor.
The even balance between those who rank Longley as Maines most effec­
tive and successful governor since 1960 and those who rank him as the state's 
least successful governor is an indication that, overall, his status as an 
Independent did not affect his ability to accomplish his goals. Predictably, 
those who rank Longley as Maine's best governor since 1960 felt the state 
was at least better off on account of his governorship. Those who ranked him 
third were split in their assessments of him and those who placed him fourth 
on the list felt that state was worse off.
Respondents who believe Maine is worse off as a result of the Longley 
Administration were asked whether Longley's own governing style or his Inde- . 
pendent status was primarily responsible. A few people felt Longley did the 
best he, or any Independent, could do. The two-party system, whatever its 
faults, is the best we can do. Longley was not a part of that system and, 
as an Independent, had no base of support in government to carry out his poli­
cies.
The Maine Times, though critical of Longley, believed Longley's use
cf the veto provided him with the means of implementing his policy,
Longley held up laws that were written only to benefit special 
interests or drafted without knowledge of their true fiscal im­
pact. In fact, at times Longley was being politically coura­
geous. He threw out the kinds of bills other governors have 
let slide through for fear of political repercussions. Gover­
nor Longley has now developed a consistent pattern of knocking 
down legislation that would handle a problem piecemeal rather” 
than statewide. 49
However, seventy percent of the respondents to this question believe the nega­
tive impact of Longley's Independent governorship was primarily due to Gcver-
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nor Longley and not his Independent status. Longley's confrontational style 
and attempts to run government as a business are the two primary reasons why 
they believe Longley did not succeed. State Representative Ruth Joseph as­
sesses his lack of success as a result of Longley’s leadership,
Governor Longley was a very good person--but a terrible 
governor and politician. As an individual, you would 
have to look hard and far to find such a fine man. How­
ever, his tactics his day to day operation of state gov­
ernment bordered on disastrous. Trying to run govern­
ment as a private business does not work.
TABLE TEN: WHAT IS THE LIKELIHOOD THAT MAINE WILL HAVE ANOTHER INDEPENDENT 
GOVERNOR IN THE NEXT 20 YEARS?
n: 41
higly likely somewhat likely doubtful impossible
2% 32 63* 2in
Over ten years have passed since James Longley was elected the nation’s 
only Independent governor since 1937. David Broder's prediction, cited at the 
beginning of this paper, that an Independent movement was ready to spread 
through the country, has not proven true. No other indepedent has been elected 
governor of any state since Governor Longley
Most political observers questioned in Maine believe it is doubtful 
another Independent will be elected in the near future. Governor Longley was 
right— his election was more likely to strengthen the two party system than 
to weaken it, though his reasoning was wrong. Other Independents did not rise 
up to remind the parties when they were getting complacent. Instead, members 
of both political parties in Maine determined that it was too easy for an In­
dependent to get on the ballot and requirements were made more difficult.
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There are various reasons why it is doubtful Maine will elect another 
Independent governor soon. The lack of the strong anti-politician sentiment 
after Watergate is a major reason. However, there are other factors than 
the political atmosphere. Longley was ignored by the major parties. It is 
unlikely they will be willing to allow another third party candidate such a 
luxury. Longley also had the benefit of good name recognition and the money 
to run a campaign on equal terms with the major parties. These elements are 
rare in independent campaigns. Longley also had extraordinary energy, which 
he put to work in his campaign.
Maine news reporters Bill Johnson and Don Carrigan summarize the views
of those who feel the election of another Independent governor in Maine is
doubtful and somewhat likely, respectively. Bill Johnson explains,
. . .  I think Governor Lonaley's election was a phenomenon 
of the times. He capitalized on the distrust that grew 
from Watergate. He ran as an ‘outsider.1 His lack of 
politcal experience was an advantage at that time. He 
ran as a business man, a 'non-politician* at a time when 
people didn't trust politicians and thought government 
should be run more like a business.
My feeling is that Longley's success was possible 
because of the political climate at that time, and because 
of his personal charisma.
Because of his success, the amjor party candidates 
have adopted some of his rhetoric and posistions, in effect 
pre-empting another independent from filling the gap that 
the major parties had left open for Longley.
Don Carrigan believes the gap still exists and there is rooom enough 
for an Independent,
I think this possibliity exists because the Maine 
Republican party is in such bad shape, and the Democrats 
will seem to be putting forth a succession of "politicians"... 
Attorney General, unsuccessful candidate for senator, etc.
There is an ever increasing cynicism, I believe, on 
the part of the voter. They want people with obvious 
experience at doing things other than getting elected or 
being lawyers.
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This* of course, is not unlike the national mood 
that swept Reagan into office,..but the Maine GOP is not 
in a position to really capitalize on the opportunity. The 
part might rebuild over time, but not quickly. Therefore, 
a good Independent has a chance...provided he or she has 
the charisma needed to overcome the political problems.
I think an Independent can be successful, but it will 
have to be a remarkable person. He or she would have to 
combine the missionary zeal of Longley with the political 
savvy and willingness to compromise of Ken Curtis. Having 
no party, the Independent must be strong enough to function 
without one, yet sufficiently attentive and attractive to 
make them both feel a part of what he is doing. Not easy.
This study of Governor Longley is one case study of an Independent. James 
Longley was unique among American politicians. He remains the only Independent 
governor elected to any state since 1937. This study, however, does not attempt 
to determine whether Longley is unique among Independents elected to other 
political offices in the United States. Further research may prove valuable in 
understanding the characteristics of Independents and whether they are linked 
by similarities not traditionally found in memebers of the two major parties.
Governor Longley illustrates that an Independent may be successful 
in meeting his goals and objectives once elected. Longley attempted to limit 
the size of government. It would be interesting to learn how Governor Longley’s 
success compares with the success of Independent politicians with similar goals. 
A comparison between the success of conservative and liberal Independents can 
be usedful in determining whether the potential success of an Independent is 
limited by his political philosophy.
James B. Longley and other Independent candidates for political office 
provide valuable lessons in American government. Knowledge of their role and 
success in government will provide a greater understanding of the two party 
system.
49
APPENDIX
An alphabetical i.jting of the thirty-seven people who identified 
their responses to the questionnaire. Five questionnaires were 
returned anonymously.
NAME PRESENT OCCUPATION(Party affiliation; A=Longley appointee
Armstrong, R.W. State Representative, Insurance agency executive (R)
Baker, H.R. State Representative (D)
Bott, John State Representative (R)
Brown, Darryl State Representative (R)
Brown, Larry State Senator, Developer and Businessman (D)
Carrier, J. Robert State Representative (D)
Carrigan, Don T.V. news reporter/anchor
Clark, Nancy Randall State Senator and teacher (D)
Cauvcal, Paul State Senator and attorney (A)
Collins, S.W. State Senator and attorney (R)
Daigle, J.M. President, Casco Northern Bank (A)
Davies, Richard Lobbyist
Davis, Leland State Senator, assistant Republican Leader (R)
Dillenback, Robert Retired V.P. and Director of a large corporation
Gosselin, H.L. Hospital Administrator (A)
Hansen, Donald Editorial Page Director
Hichens, Walter State Senator (R)
Higgins, H. Craig State Representative, Chairman, Taxation Committee (D)
Hochadel, J. Legal Counsel (A)
Johnson, Bill News Reporter
Joseph, Ruth State Representative (D)
50
Lebowitz, Catherine State Representative (R)
Lowe, Ralph Director, Maine Department of Mental Health 
and Ketardation (A)
Maisel, S. Professor of Government, Colby College
Mayo, Joseph State Representative and accountant (D)
McGregor, Jim Public Relations Director, Bath Iron Works
(Governor Longley's campaign coordinator 
and too assistant)
Millett, H. Sawin, Jr. Educator (A)
Murray, Robert, Jr. State Representative (D)
Nickerson, John Professor of Political Science, University of 
Maine, Augusta
Palmer, Kenneth Professor of Political Science, University of 
Maine, Orono
Randal 1, Ed State Representative (R)
Richard, Alex State Representative (D)
Scarpino, Guy State Representative, lobsterman, and shipbuilder (R)
Sewall, Charlotte State Senator and Wholesale Lobster Dealer (R)
Trafton, Richard State Senator and lawyer (D)
Violette, Paul E. State Senate Majority Leader (D)
Weymouth, Norman State Representative and teacher (R)
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